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Table 3.4  Structure of Expenditures in  the Central Government, 1970-84 
(as percentage of  total expenditure) 
1970  1976  1980  1982  1984 
Personnel  54. I  42.4  46.4  20.8  59.7 
Materials  I .4  6.3  7.3  3.0  5.5 
Transfers  16.3  16.6  11.6  10.0  19.8 
Debt service  13.6  2.1  16.3  26.8  7.6 
Other  14.6  22.7  18.4  4.1  7.6 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Sources:  Data refer to central  government  (TGN) and are based on  the data given  in table  5.4 of  Breuer 
(1988), which in turn were provided by  UDAPE in the Ministry of  Planning, Bolivia. 
Payments to Central Bank  .o  .0  .0  40.7  .0 
central administration increased by  92.4 percent between 1970 annd  1982, 
yielding an average annual rate of growth of 5.6 percent. This rate of growth 
was  well  above that  of  the  urban  population and  of  GDP,  with  the  main 
increases occumng  between  1970 and  1976. We  know  from  the  political 
analysis that succeeding administrations used patronage as a way to cement 
patron-client relations, and thereby build a political base of support. It does 
indeed seem that the result was a profligate and inefficient overextension of 
public sector employment. 
Expenditures on investment that were on average around 2 percent of GDP 
during 1976-79 fell to around 0.3 percent during the crisis years of 1981-85. 
Since central government investment expenditure is mainly on social over- 
head, the impact of its substantial reduction has important repercussions on 
income  distribution  and  on  growth.  The  fall  in  this  particular  type  of 
investment will have long-lasting effects, the magnitude of which has not yet 
been fully appreciated. 
4  Trade Policies, 1970- 85 
It should be recalled from our overview in chapter 1 that the long-run growth 
of  the Bolivian economy has been critically determined by  the exports of 
primary  commodities,  mainly  tin  and  natural  gas.  Bolivia’s  economy 
depends crucially on the performance of the export sector. In turn, shifts in 
indebtedness have coincided, procyclically, with the export cycle. Bolivia’s 
dollar export earnings during 1970-88  are shown in table 4.1. 
Export  earnings  and,  by  extension,  the  domestic  economy  have  been 
greatly  affected by  the  instability of  Bolivia’s export  prices.  As  a result, 
policymakers have focused on measures to stabilize and improve Bolivia’s 203  BolividChapter 4 
Table 4.1  Export Earnings, 1970-88  (in millions of U.S. dollars) 
1970  190.4  1980  942.2 
1971  181.6  1981  912.4 
1972  201.3  1982  827.7 
1973  260.8  1983  755.1 
1974  556.5  1984  724.5 
1975  444.7  1985  623.4 
1976  563.0  1986  545.5 
1977  634.3  1987  518.7 
1978  627.3  1988  542.5 
1979  759.8 
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics. 
terms of  trade, particularly with respect to tin. These measures have been 
pursued mainly by  participation in international stabilization agreements on 
tin and  by  lobbying to forestall sales of  this commodity by  the industrial 
countries.  In regard to natural gas,  the trade policy  has  been much  more 
passive. 
Many  domestic  economic  policies  have  affected  the  development  of 
Bolivia’s  foreign trade performance in recent years.  Some of  the policies 
were particularly harmful and played an important role in the severity of the 
crisis in  the  1980s. In  part  because of  adverse trade policies and in part 
because of adverse terms-of-trade shocks that were out of Bolivia’s control, 
Bolivia  suffered  one  of  the  sharpest  declines  in  Latin  America  in  the 
purchasing power of  exports  (PPX) between  1981 and  1988, as shown in 
table 4.2.’ In this chapter, we review the main trade policies and their effects 
on  trade performance.  Particular attention is paid  to  exchange rate  man- 
agement. The structure of  tariffs and the taxation of  natural resources are 
also examined. The important question that underlies the whole chapter is 
why,  despite  a  high  dependency  on  exports,  Bolivia’s  long-run  export 
performance has been so poor. 
4.1  Export Policies 
Bolivia’s  export  policies  during  1961 -  8 1  were  primarily  aimed  at 
strengthening or  at  least  stabilizing Bolivia’s  terms of  trade in  the  major 
commodity markets.’  From 1982 to 1985, little attention was paid to trade 
policies given the overwhelming problems of  internal stabilization. 
By  far the most important scheme of  price stabilization was provided by 
Bolivia’s  participation  in  the  International  Tin  Agreements  (ITA).  Five 
agreements were signed-1956,  1961, 1966, 1971, and  1976-but  Bolivia 
did not join in signing the last one in  1976, in protest against price targets 
that it regarded as too low. In  the  1970s, agreements of lesser scope were 
also signed for tungsten and antimony, other important mineral exports of 
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Table 4.2  The Purchasing Power of  Exports (PPX) in Bolivia and Selected Countries, 
1988 (1980 = 100 for all indices) 









































Source:  Economic  Commission  for  Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean,  United  Nations  (ECLAC),  “Pre- 
liminary Overview  of  the  Latin  American  Economy,  1988”  (3 January 1989): table  8, export volumes; 
table 10, terms of trade; and table  12, purchasing power of exports. As explained in endnote  1 to this chapter, 
the  PPX  should equal the  product of  the export volume  index  and the  terms-of-trade  index. This  is only 
approximately true for the data shown, apparently because of  the differing coverage  of  goods in  the three 
indices reported by ECLAC. 
The ITAs were  agreed  upon  by  the  main  tin  producing  and  consuming 
countries,  with  the exception  of  the  United  States.  The governing body  of 
the ITA  is the International Tin Council (ITC).  The main, but not the only, 
instrument for achieving the price stabilization objective was a buffer stock 
of tin metal financed by the producing members. In negotiations for the five 
agreements,  Bolivia,  which  had  the  highest  production  costs among  the 
producing  countries,  lobbied  systematically  for  higher  floor  and  ceiling 
prices than  those  set by  the ITC. Other producers  did not  follow Bolivia, 
feeling that a long-run policy of  high prices would backfire on them. Time 
proved them right. 
There is  considerable  controversy  over the  workings  of  the  ITC and  of 
the buffer stock. For example, there was a problem with the small size of the 
agreed-upon stock. In fact, the buffer stock became irrelevant in the booming 
market of the  1970s. Moreover, the buffer stock could hardly cope with the 
most  important destabilizing  factor  in  the  tin  market,  namely,  the  huge 
strategic stockpile of  tin  held  by  the U.S. General Service  Administration 
(GSA). In the 1980s, the ITC held prices that were much too high instead of 
allowing a smooth  accommodation  to the  weaker market  conditions.  High 
prices  induced  the  entry  of  new  producers  in  the  market and hastened  the 
process  of  technological  substitution  with  other metals  and  materials.  In 
addition, the financing of the buffer stock became a problem. This conjuction 
of an excessively high price with financing problems led to the collapse of the 
tin agreement in October 1985 and the collapse of tin prices from $5.60 per 
pound on the eve of the collapse to $2.55 per pound in July 1986, nine months 
later. The October collapse had a stunning effect:  the buffer stock declared 
insolvency and the London Metal Exchange ceased trading in this metal. The 205  BolividChapter 4 
evolution of the real price of tin (relative to the unit value of imports of the 
developing countries) was  shown in figure  1.2 in chapter 1,  in  which the 
collapse in October 1985 is plainly evident. 
Besides  the  problem  of  price  stabilization,  the  production  and  export 
activities of  the mining sector during the 1970s were adversely affected by 
onerous tax legislation, which was somewhat eased after 1979. The mining 
sector was  subjected to  two  main  types  of  taxes:  a  regalia,  which  was 
initiated in  1965, and an export tax imposed with the devaluation of  1972. 
The regalia is a tax on presumed income, given that the nominal base of the 
tax results from the difference between world mineral prices and a presumed 
cost set by the Bolivian Ministry of Mines. Since presumptive costs changed 
infrequently, the regalia  functioned in fact as a tax  on the gross value of 
output. The regalia overtaxed the mining sector, and particularly the weakest 
enterprises,  in  years  of  low  mineral  prices,  whereas  it  failed  to  fiscally 
appropriate the rents that  were generated in years of rising mineral prices 
(Gillis 1978). Moreover, tax codes did not encourage investment in mineral 
exploration and development. 
Petroleum was a major export in Bolivia. But after 1973, with the rise in 
domestic consumption and the progressive depletion of reserves, the amount 
left  for  exports  decreased  substantially, and  Bolivia  ceased  to  be  a  net 
petroleum  exporter  in  1977.  The  systematic  domestic  underpricing  of 
petroleum products encouraged the demand for both domestic consumption 
and  for  contraband  exports,  which  hindered  a  sensible  development  of 
petroleum  exports  and  appropriate  tax  revenues.  In  addition,  petroleum 
production and exports have been subjected to punitive taxation  and  this, 
too, has had long-run costs in discouraging supply. 
Bolivia has important deposits of  natural gas. In fact, the export prospects 
for energy lie mainly in natural gas. Exports of gas to Argentina have been a 
very important source of  foreign exchange. In the 1970s, gas exports were 
already marred by  controversies about price,  and  these controversies have 
gained in intensity in the last years.  Unfortunately, pricing principles were 
not  clearly established  when  the  gas  pipeline  to  Argentina was  put  into 
operation in  1972.  A  negotiation during  the  1970s between  Bolivia  and 
Brazil to export natural gas to Brazil did not succeed because of  domestic 
political opposition to sales of  the  “national  patrimony”  to Brazil. These 
negotiations have been resumed under the New  Economic Policy begun in 
1985. 
In  1977 the Bolivian government decided to subsidize nontraditional (or 
minor) exports,  including selected agricultural products and manufactures. 
The  Law  of  Fiscal  Incentives  of  1977,  and  its  reform  in  1982,  for 
nontraditional exports included exemptions from all export taxes as well as 
from import duties for inputs into exports and a tax rebate certificate granted 
to  the  exporters.  The  certificate,  which  amounted to  between  10 and  25 
percent of the FOB value of exports, could be used to pay taxes on income, 206  Juan Antonio Morales and Jeffrey D. Sachs 
sales, or imports. It could also be sold freely for use by other exporters. The 
tax certificate was a direct subsidy that partially compensated an increasing 
overvaluation of the peso. 
An ex post evaluation of  export policies demonstrates that these policies 
were not always clearly stated,  nor were their effects fully appraised.  It is 
clear that with respect to traditional exports, fiscal measures were generally 
inimical to  a  long-term  increase  in  supply.  The  fiscal  system  focused  on 
expropriating economic rents-a  legitimate objective, of course-more  than 
on encouraging the opening of new  mines or the drilling of  new  wells.  In 
regard to the promotion of nontraditional exports, it is possible to make two 
appraisals. First, the scheme of 1977 (and the reform of 1982) was subject to 
considerable abuse,  without  really  leading to increased incentives for more 
exports.  Second, the  exportable products  that  benefited  from  this  export 
promotion  policy constituted less than 5 percent of the value of all exports. 
In  fact,  the  emphasis  on  fiscal  measures  obscured  the  fact  that  domestic 
firms and  industrialists  first had  to learn  how  to  improve  their production 
and  merchandising methods.  Thus, it appears that more effective forms of 
encouraging nontraditonal exports could have been sought. 
4.2  Import Policies 
Major import  tariff  reforms took  place  in  1967, 1973, 1982, 1985, and 
1986. Before  the  changes  of  1985 and  1986, the  most  important was  the 
reform in  1973, which had been distorted with piecemeal changes in the tax 
rates but which nonetheless affected the schedule in significant ways. A very 
important feature of the tariff structure in place until  1985 was the existence 
of  preferential tariff  provisions  for (1) commodities,  according to the final 
use to which they were put; (2) goods used in the northwestern regions of the 
country; and (3) goods coming from countries with which Bolivia had (and 
has) economic agreements for bilateral reductions in tariffs. 
Examples of preferential tariffs of the first type were the special provisions 
for  imports  for  the  mining  and  petroleum  sectors  and  the  exemptions 
accorded by the Investment Laws of  1972 and 1981. Preferences of the third 
type  included  the  Bolivian  Lists  of  Tariff  Concessions  to  the  member 
countries  of  the  Latin  American  Free  Trade  Association  and  the  Andean 
Group.  These  provisions  for  preferential  tariffs  affected  an  important 
proportion of Bolivian imports. Depending on the year, the value of imports 
subject to the preferential  rates  ranged  between  25 and 35 percent  of  total 
imports. 
Considerations  of  government  revenue  and  exigencies  of  the balance of 
payments (i.e., the need to constrain the fall of reserves in the context of a 
pegged  exchange  rate)  prevailed  over the  view  of  using  tariffs  (and other 
import policies) as effective tools for guiding industrial policy. The piecemeal 
changes eroded the original intentions of  coherent and limited protection in 207  BolividChapter 4 
the  1973 reform  and  in  subsequent tariff  changes.  While one could  find 
economic reasons to justify the distinct tariff rates in the reforms on protection 
and  revenue grounds,  the piecemeal changes introduced a high degree of 
dispersion of the tariffs, reflecting ad hoc considerations with little economic 
justification. 
Frequent  changes were often brought about  by  the pressures of  special 
interest groups of industrialists and importers. Before 1986, tariff duties, as 
is to be expected,were high on luxuries and competitive consumer goods and 
exhibited significant variation.  On  the  other  hand,  tariff  rates  for  capital 
goods were very low. Duties on raw materials and intermediate goods, which 
are necessary  for domestic manufacturing and hence could be  treated in a 
manner like that for capital goods, were, however, quite variable. 
The effective rate of protection is better than the nominal tariff rate as an 
indicator of  the extent to which a particular set of  tariffs protects domestic 
producers.  Table  4.3  shows the  effective rates  for  selected products pre- 
vailing  in  the  second  half  of  the  1970s.  It  is  clear  that  there  is  con- 
siderable  variation  among  the  effective  rates.  Note  that  effective  rates 
have also been computed for imports subject to quantitative restrictions by 
finding the  implicit tariffs involved, which  were calculated as the relative 
difference between international and  domestic prices.  This procedure was 
used as well in the case of  prohibited imports. 
More specific conclusions can also be drawn from the data in table 4.3. 
First, the high protection provided by the import bans stands out. Apart from 
the  case  of  import  prohibitions,  the  most  important  characteristic  that 
appears in the structure of effective protection is the high effective rates for 
goods considered luxuries. The effective rates are considerably higher than 
the already high nominal tariff rates.  Second, it  is clear that there is high 
effective protection for domestic production. In the cases of goods subject to 
import bans there is complete protection, but this is also true in many cases 
which  are  only  subject  to  tariffs.  Third,  most  intermediate products  for 
industrial  usage  have  low  (or  even  negative)  effective  rates,  which  are 
generally very  close  to  the  nominal  rates.  Fourth,  the  effective rates  for 
capital goods are close to  the nominal rates; however,  in  many  cases the 
effective rates are negative. 
Quantitative restrictions,  including  prohibitions,  were  used  along  with 
tariffs to limit imports during 1970-82,  but their scope was reduced during 
the decade. In 1978 less than 2 percent of the Brussels Trade Nomenclature 
was  subject  to  prohibitions.  During  the  crisis  years  of  1982-85,  many 
luxury  and  competitive  imports  were  banned  for  balance-of-payments 
purposes (around 10 percent of  the items of the Brussels Trade Nomencla- 
ture). 
Smuggling has greatly limited the application of  tariff and quota policies 
and has substantially hurt government revenues. Once again, the expansion 
of  smuggling was a symptom of  the increasing administrative weakness of 208  Juan Antonio Morales and Jeffrey D. Sachs 
Table 4.3  Bolivian Nominal Tariffs and Effective Rates of  Protection by Industry 
(31  December 1977) 
Standard 
Mean  Deviation 
A. Summary statistics for a list of337  groups of commodities 
Nominal tariff 
Effective rate of protection 
38.9%  28.0% 
74.4%  97.5% 
Simple correlation between nominal and effective rates  = 0.88 
Rank order correlation between nominal and effective rates  = 0.88 
Effective 
Nominal  Rate of 
Tariff  Protection 
B. Indices for selected items within this list 
Livestock products 
Chemical & fertilizer mineral products 
Butter 
Cheese 
Canned fruits & vegetables 







Premanufactured wooden structures 
Papers for sanitary use 
Pharmaceutical preparations 
Paints, inks, & dyes 
Leather 




Farm machinery, except tractors 
Textile industry machinery 
Industrial furnaces 
Business & office machines 
Domestic kitchen appliances 
Washers 
Fans & other domestic appliances 
Domestic refrigerators 
Trucks 
Household radio & TV sets 
Motorcycles, bicycles, & parts 



































































Source:  Morales, Ulloa, and Jimenez (1978), table 7 209  BoliviaKhapter 4 
the public sector. Although there are no good data for this illegal activity, a 
fair guess for the late 1970s was that contraband imports constituted around 
20 percent of legal imports. The expansion in contraband imports after 1978 
is also related to the laundering of dollars earned in the drug trade.3 
4.3  Economic Integration 
Bolivia has adhered to two main economic integration schemes, the Latin 
American Free Trade Association (LAFTA), which later became the Latin 
American  Integration Association,  and  the  Andean Group,  as  well  as  to 
a host of  other organizations of  economic cooperation with less ambitious 
aims. 
Bolivia joined LAFTA in  1966 and was given a relatively less developed 
country status with preferential treatment that consisted essentially in post- 
poning  dates  for  the  implementation of  tariff  reductions and  dismantling 
nontariff barriers. The direct benefits of  Bolivia’s association with LAFTA 
were  virtually  unnoticeable.  Bolivian  exports  to  the  countries  consisted 
mainly  of  petroleum,  natural  gas,  and  minerals.  These  exports,  however 
important, would have taken place anyway, with or without LAFTA mem- 
bership. Bolivian imports of  manufactures from LAFTA grew at a very fast 
pace, but this expansion can hardly be  attributed to its participation in the 
organization. 
The  apparent  failure  of  LAFTA,  at  least  from  the  viewpoint  of  the 
relatively more poor Andean member countries, led to the formation of  the 
Andean Group with the signing of  the Cartagena Agreement in May  1969. 
The  Andean  Group  integration  scheme had  two  main  instruments: (1)  a 
customs union, and (2) a joint mechanism of  investment programming for a 
list of  goods for the Sectorial Industrial Development Program (SIDP). In 
addition, in order to  counteract the adverse effects that  these instruments 
might unintentionally provoke, the Andean Group countries agreed upon a 
set of  measures to harmonize other policies that affected trade and agreed to 
set common policies for the treatment of foreign private investment. 
Bolivia was again given a relatively less developed country status in the 
group,  along with  Ecuador,  and both were accorded preferential treatment 
for the two main instruments and subordinate policies. Economic integration 
within the Andean Group created considerable hope among Bolivian policy- 
makers,  who  thought  that  it  would  provide  the  big  push  necessary  for 
Bolivian industrial development with  the  incentive of  a  large market  for 
manufactures.  Bolivia,  therefore,  enthusiastically  supported  the  Andean 
Group at the outset. 
By  1978 there was considerable disillusionment with the workings of the 
Andean Group among government officials and industrialist organizations in 
Bolivia. From their point of  view, the benefits of  integration seemed rather 
scant  and  the  costs  were  presumed  to  be  high.  The  fact  that  the  whole 210  Juan Antonio Morales and Jeffrey D. Sachs 
Andean  Group  entered  into  a  state of  crisis  contributed to  the  problem. 
Chile,  with  the  most  healthy  of  the  Andean  Group  economies,  in  fact 
withdrew from the group in the mid-1970s under the policy of the Pinochet 
regime. The Andean Group has continued in prolonged crisis, a crisis which 
deepened markedly with the international economic turmoil of  the  1980s. 
In the aftermath of  the hyperinflation, with public policies dominated by 
the  need  to  consolidate  the  stabilization,  Bolivia’s  participation  in  the 
Andean  Group  and  in  all  the  other  integration schemes  is  almost  dead. 
Notwithstanding this, the collapse of the markets for traditional exports may 
inspire Bolivian policymakers to  seek some fresh approaches to economic 
integration,  especially  with  Brazil  and  Argentina,  which  represent  large 
potential markets for light industrial exports from Bolivia. 
4.4  Exchange Rate Policies 
Between  1957 and  1982, Bolivia followed a regime of  unified  pegged 
official exchange rates.  The abundance of  credits from  1957 until the late 
1970s allowed the government to maintain a fixed exchange rate without the 
need to resort to explicit foreign exchange rationing, and thus prevented the 
development of  a parallel market with significant premiums. Between  1957 
and  1979, the exchange rate  showed  a  surprising stability: only once,  in 
October 1972, was the peso devalued. After the drying up of foreign inflows 
in the early  1980s and with the resistance of  the government to undertake 
timely devaluations, the economy operated with what  was  in effect a dual 
exchange  rate:  an  overvalued  and  rationed  official  rate  and  a  floating, 
parallel (sometimes illegal) rate.  After  1985 the exchange rate  was  again 
unified and operated as a managed float. 
On  some  occasions  during  the  1960s  and  1970s,  foreign  exchange 
reserves fell significantly, prompting policy measures to avoid an outright 
devaluation  through  hidden  or  explicit  rationing  of  foreign  exchange. 
Various temporary trade policy instruments were used for this purpose. On at 
least two occasions, a uniform increase in import tariff rates was used as a 
substitute for devaluation from the import side: in  1969, an almost uniform 
surtax of  10 percent was levied on all imports; in  1975, another surtax of  3 
percent was created. Export subsidies for minor exports were also used  to 
compensate for overvaluation in 1977. However, the percentage of trade that 
benefited from those subsidies was very small. 
As mentioned in section 4.2, quantitative restrictions were also used for 
balance-of-payments purposes.  For  instance,  in  1969  the  restoration  of 
external  equilibrium  was  obtained  with  temporary  prohibitions  on  the 
imports of  automobiles and of  luxuries.  A new  tool  in the  kit  of  import 
controls was introduced in 1976 in the form of  prior import  deposit^.^  It is 
important to note that these deposits were both a monetary measure and a 
tariff-like regulation raising the cost of  imports.  Because of  both features, 211  BoliviaChapter 4 
they  were  initially  very  effective in  curtailing imports.  However, to  the 
extent that importers could roll over their deposits, the monetary contraction 
aspect was lost, except when there were increases in the level of  imports. 
Thus fiscal and, to a lesser extent, monetary measures were used to avoid 
open devaluations of  the peso in  the  1960s and the  1970s. In  accordance 
with  the  spirit of  the  times,  devaluation was  viewed  as a declaration of 
failure in economic policymaking. General Banzer, who had to go through a 
devaluation in  1972, paid the costs, political and otherwise, of  very painful 
adjustments in  the  economy  distributed over more  than  a  year  after the 
devaluation. Although never  publicly  declared,  a  widely held  opinion  in 
government  circles  at  the  time  was  that  the  boom  in  export  prices  in 
1973-74  saved Bolivia from a string of  further devaluations. 
The devaluation of  1972 deserves some additional attention. Since the end 
of  1969  when  the  assets  of  the  Bolivian  Gulf  Oil  Corporation  were 
nationalized, pressures  on  the  peso  had  been  building  up.  In  1970 the 
government decided to impose some mild administrative regulations on the 
convertibility of  the peso; for instance, requiring a full registration in  the 
Central Bank of demanders of foreign e~change.~  These regulations were not 
sufficient to avoid  the drain on foreign  exchange reserves of  the  Central 
Bank.  By  the  end  of  1972, it  became  clear that  a devaluation was  un- 
avoidable. The IMF was called for consultations, and  Bolivia applied for 
a  standby loan. The peso  was  devalued by  40 percent, and  some public 
sector prices, as well as interest rates on savings deposits, were increased. 
Workers obtained a uniform compensation of  $b 135, equivalent to U.S.  $7 
(1972 dollars), at the new  rate of  exchange. After the devaluation, many 
prices  were  subject to  controls and  fixed  at  their pre-devaluation levels. 
Some of the prices were revised upward only in October 1973 and the rest in 
January  1974. Strong excess demand  conditions made  the  revisions un- 
avoidable. 
In table 4.4 we show how the peso incurred a significant real appreciation 
vis-B-vis  the  U.S.  dollar during  1973-84.  The relatively long  period  of 
overvaluation  had  important implications for  resource  allocation.  In  the 
mining  sector,  the  combination  of  overvaluation plus  punitive  taxation 
shifted resources from there to the nontradable manufacturing sector and the 
service sector.  Overvaluation also encouraged  the  expansion of  the  very 
capital-intensive activities  of  tin  smelting  and  oil  refining.  Traditional 
exports and nontraditional ones, such as commercial agriculture, suffered. 
If  overvaluation hurt exports,  one may  wonder why  the issue was not 
debated more fully at the time or why there was not  a significant lobby to 
push for a devaluation. The following reasons may  be hypothesized. First, 
oil and mineral exporters can usually live with overvalued exchange rates 
until the rates are severely misaligned. Given their cost structure, exporters 
usually place more emphasis on lessening the weight of direct taxation than 
on the exchange rate to maintain their after-tax profitability. Second, the high 212  Juan Antonio Morales and Jeffrey D. Sachs 
Table 4.4  The Real Exchange Rate in Bolivia,  1970-84 































Source: IMF data. Note: The index is constructed as PIEP, where P  is the Bolivian consumer price index, 
E is the exchange rate (pesos per dollar), and P is the U.S. CPI. For each year, annual averages are used for 
the three indexes. Note that E is the official exchange rate; in  the  1980s there was a large and persistent gap 
between the official exchange rate and the parallel market exchange rate. 
prices for the main exports, well above previous trend, concealed the need to 
correct the exchange rates.  Although profit margins in the exporting sector 
decreased with overvaluation,  they  were still very high in mineral,  oil, and 
gas exports. 
It  was  not  fully  realized  that  overvaluation  hindered  the  expansion  of 
potential exports. Since no significant actual exports were greatly damaged 
by overvaluation, no political lobby was established to gain a better price for 
the  dollar  earned  in  the  exporting activities.  Also,  hopes  for  exports  of 
manufactures were riding on the Andean Group market, and little attention 
was paid to the development of other markets. Markets in the Andean Group 
were  protected  by  a  relatively  high  common  external  tariff,  while  trade 
liberalization  within  the  group  benefited  mainly  noncompetitive  imports 
from the  partner countries.  In  those  circumstances,  overvaluation,  if  not 
severe, was not the major hindrance for export promotion of manufactures to 
the protected  market.  In  the event, however,  that  market  turned  out to be 
much too limited to support much manufacturing export activity in Bolivia. 
The hypothesis that overvaluation  constituted  a fiscal measure to extract 
resources from the  hard-to-tax  public  enterprises  also has to be taken into 
account. The weakness of the central government vis-u-vis the public enter- 
prises,  and  especially  the  inability  of  the  central  government  to  tax  the 
state enterprises directly, may explain one attraction to overvalued exchange 
rates.  Such  rates  permitted  the  transfer  of  resources  from  the  exporting 
sector,  formed  mainly  by  public  enterprises,  to  the  nonexporting  public 
sector, formed mainly by the central government.6 
The abrupt reduction in net foreign reserve flows in 1982, combined with 
the  underlying  budgetary  disequilibrium,  at  first  caused  a  rapid  loss  of 213  BolividChapter 4 
reserves and a collapse of the fixed exchange rate regime in March of  that 
year. The collapse was followed by  a dual market with a fixed official rate 
for a handful of  transactions and a floating rate for all other transactions, 
either of  current account or  capital  account.  Unexpectedly for the public 
authorities, the exchange rate depreciated very rapidly in the parallel market, 
causing an upsurge of  inflation. The difficulties of managing the exchange 
rate during the high-inflation period and the unification of  rates at a realistic 
level  with  the  stabilization program  of  August  1985 are  discussed more 
completely in chapter 5. 
4.5  Capital Flight 
The overvalued exchange rate and lax management of  the public sector 
contributed to widespread capital flight in the  1970s and  1980s. Ugarteche 
(1986) and the World Bank (1985) give some estimates of capital flight based 
on the  “errors  and omissions”  account in the balance of   payment^.^  The 
average annual capital flight is estimated to have been as follows (in millions 
of  U.S. dollars): 1971-75,  $77.3 (4 percent of  the  1975 GDP); 1976-81, 
$216.9,  (6 percent of  the  1981 GDP); and  1982-83,  $106.2 (3 percent of 
the  1983 GDP).  Bank  deposits held  by  Bolivians in  banks in  the United 
States were estimated to be on the order of $400 million in 1985, amounting 
to around 10 percent of GDP. This is an extremely conservative estimate of 
offshore bank accounts, especially in  view of  the fact that it is easy to hide 
foreign ownership of  bank  accounts and  since many  accounts are held  in 
non-U.  S . banks. 
What were the forces behind  capital flight? We  have already mentioned 
that overvaluation coupled with expectations of devaluation is an important 
explanatory factor. In addition, three other factors deserve to be mentioned. 
First, illegal transfers to private individuals resulting from the mismanage- 
ment of public sector investments were likely to be exported to safe havens 
abroad. Similarly, subsidized loans, diverted from their intended uses, were 
placed in assets abroad where they could not be seized by the debt collectors. 
Second,  fears  of  expropriation or  of  controls  on  the  free  movements  of 
capital have motivated a substantial portion of capital flight. In this regard, 
one of the most negative effects of the dedollarization measure of  1982 was 
its  impact  on  capital  flight,  since  individual  savers  were  left  with  an 
unsatisfied demand for deposits in the domestic banking system and had to 
look abroad for a safe vehicle for their savings.’  Third, earnings from the 
coca trade have  surely generated extensive capital flight, largely for non- 
macroeconomic reasons. 
4.6  Conclusions on Poor Export Performance 
It is clear from our survey of trade policies in Bolivia that relatively little 
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potential.  Traditional  exports  were  seen  as  offering  rents  that  could  be 
distributed  to  other  parts  of  the  economy.  Nontraditional  exports  were 
hindered severely by  an  inadequate exchange rate policy and by  a range of 
fiscal incentives which really did not have much effect on the margin in the 
incentives to produce nontraditional exportables,  Public investments in the 
tradable  sector, as  discussed in  the  previous chapter,  generally were  un- 
profitable and socially costly. They were motivated more by  political con- 
siderations and  easy  foreign  credit,  rather  than  by  a  careful  cost-benefit 
analysis. Finally, unwarranted policy hopes were held for export promotion 
within the context of regional integration schemes, particularly the Andean 
Pact. These regional schemes proved to be superfluous for Bolivia, not only 
because the target  market remained very  small even after integration, but 
also because the Andean countries almost all descended into deep crisis in 
the 1980s. 
5  Aspects of Foreign Debt 
Accumulation, 1952-85 
As was shown in table  1.8, Bolivia has depended significantly on foreign 
savings to finance gross capital formation since the late 1950s. The bulk of 
that  foreign  financing  has  come  in  the  form  of  medium-  and  long-term 
(MLT) loans to the public sector, which is the category of capital inflow that 
we  will examine in  this chapter.  Unfortunately, it  is difficult to study the 
foreign debt of  the Bolivian private  sector because of  a lack  of  adequate 
data, though available information suggests that the debt of the public sector 
is indeed by  far the dominant form of  external indebtedness.'  It should be 
mentioned, however, that private nonguaranteed debt increased very rapidly 
in  the crucial  subperiod  1978-82,  just  preceding  the  extreme macroeco- 
nomic crisis.  The measured short-term debt remained fairly constant over 
time,  but  the  quality  of  the  data  on  this  type  of  debt  prevents  us  from 
drawing any firm conclusions. The frequent shifts in the classification of the 
debt because of reschedulings, arrears, and the assumption of the debt of one 
sector by another during the past several years makes the analysis even more 
difficult. 
An  historical view of Bolivia's borrowing can help to discriminate among 
the different factors responsible for the debt crisis.  Bolivia had  access to 
loans from official multilateral sources and from governments since the final 
years of the  1950s. These credits had  a concessional element,  the  size of 
which  decreased significantly over  time.  Already  by  the  first half  of  the 